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The overall theme of this paper is increasing knowledge of the evolution of
Chinese priorities and strategy since the Korean War, and how the evolution of China’s
relationships reveals changes in priorities. Why were these partnerships entered into on
the part of China? What was China’s strategic thinking? How do strengths and
weaknesses in these partnerships reflect China’s changing priorities? To attempt to
answer these questions, three case studies are used to reveal and analyze changes: SinoNorth Korean relations since the Korean War, Sino-Russian relations after the end of the
Cold War, and Chinese participation (relations with member states) in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. Consideration in this paper will also be given to the future
stability of China’s involvement with Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
"…No amount of stealthy diplomatic posturing can obscure the fact that
China is growing more powerful and more assertive by the day, and in the
process, a new world order is being shaped. Lest anyone suspect hostility in
this rebuttal of China’s new line, one hastens to add that this is exactly the way
it should be. China obviously constitutes a huge slice of humanity. It has an
exceptionally long history of power on the world stage, against which the last
two centuries of relative weakness are a mere blip. And like any fast- rising
power, its re-emergence will change the rules of the game."1
China today is recognized in the global community as a rising power with
incredible potential. Chinese rapid economic growth is impressive and continues each
year, seemingly unstoppable in its progress. China’s role in the international community
is growing ever more involved, both bi-laterally and multi-laterally. Regionally, the
same is true as the country can celebrate membership in many regional organizations.
China, however, was not always in this position of growing prominence. Questions
remain about China’s rise and positioning as it pursues strategic partnerships to
accomplish goals of major growth and success. How did China work its way from
isolation to integration? How has China utilized partnerships with other countries and
involvement in regional organizations to advance its position? How have strategic goals
1

Herald French, “Letter from China: Is It A ‘Peaceful Rise’? U.S. Shouldn’t Bet On It,”
The International Herald Tribune, April 20, 2006,
http://www.howardwfrench.com/archives/2006/04/21/letter_from_china_is_it_a_peaceful
_rise_us_shouldnt_bet_on_it/ (accessed September 3, 2008).
1

shifted over time, changing from the pursuit of Communist revolution to Capitalist
reform and economic growth? In considering these broad questions about China’s
growth, more specific questions arise about China’s relationships since the Korean War.
What happened to the strength of the Chinese-North Korean partnership? Is the
post Cold-War Chinese-Russian partnership built on similar fragile ground or is it here to
stay? Will China’s relations with Russia and the SCO have the same unfriendly end as
the Chinese-North Korean relationship? How has China utilized these relationships to
accomplish strategic goals? How do these relationships reveal China’s changing
priorities? These questions and more will be considered throughout this paper, utilizing
three case studies to discuss China’s changing priorities and behavior – Sino-North
Korean relations since the Korean War, Sino-Russian relations post-Cold War, and
Chinese involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The first section analyzes China’s relationship with North Korea, showing how
the country eventually no longer satisfied buffer zone requirements and came to be in a
position to potentially jeopardize China’s promising development and future. Also
lacking in this relationship was any economic opportunity, an increasingly important
aspect of Chinese domestic and global policy. It is worth examining China’s behavioral
and policy changes toward North Korea will clearly illustrate the shift in China’s
priorities over time, justifying the Chinese government’s change to deepening relations
with Russia and the development of the SCO. This analysis gives the reader an increased
understanding of how China has planned and reacted over time, to add to the
understanding of where the roots lie for present government policy decisions and where

2

China wants to go in terms of the international system. The purpose of this paper though
is not to make predictions concerning China’s future role, but rather analyze past and
current positioning to track China’s changing strategic priorities.
Illustrating most clearly China’s shift from isolation to regional (and global) player
is its behavior toward North Korea. According to the historical tradition of Sino-North
Korean relations, their relationship was as close as lips to teeth.2 China utilized North
Korea’s strategic position as a buffer zone to keep the United States’ influence in China
during the Cold War as limited as possible: “The United States was cast in the role of leader
of imperialism, and the common struggle was against American imperialism.”3 However,
since the Cold War ended, China’s priorities where North Korea is concerned have been
changing. Although the China-North Korea relationship has persisted despite repeated
stresses and crises, relations now are fraught with tension and at an all-time low.4 China’s
2

Scott Zhou, “All Lips and Teeth – For Now,” Asia Times Online, October 21, 2006,
Saturday, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HJ21Ad01.html (accessed September 20,
2008). For a discussion of Chinese-North Korean relations, from good to bad, please
also see Kosuke Takahashi, “China’s Worsening North Korean Headache,” Online
Nautilus Institute Policy Forum, (February 8, 2005),
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0510A_Takahashi.html (accessed September 1,
2008).
3

Harold M. Vinacke, “Communist China and the Uncommitted Zone.” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 362, (November 1965): 113. It is
worth perusing his entire article as the role of Anti-Americanism in Chinese policy is
explored.
4

Takahashi (2005). For additional commentary please see Carin Zissis, “China's
Relationship with a Nuclear North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder
Online, October 24, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11791/chinas_relationship_with_a_nuclear_north_korea.h
tml (accessed November 11, 2008). Part of the article is available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2006/china-061024-cfr01.htm
(accessed December 1, 2008).
3

behavior toward North Korea since the Korean War most clearly reveals the changes in
Beijing’s strategic prioritization. An analysis of the Sino-North Korean relationship will
allow for a complete understanding of the changes in Chinese external policy behavior and
prioritization since the Korean War. This will provide for greater depth of understanding of
what drove China’s reengagement of Russia and the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.

Chinese-North Korean Relations: Big Changes
Although China began the relationship as an ardent supporter of North Korea, the
relationship has shifted from one of a Korean tributary state providing for China to the
latter, the Chinese providing for both sustenance and survival in North Korea. During a
2006 visit to Beijing, Chairman Kim Jung-il is described as the one arriving with “empty
suitcases” to be filled instead of offering gifts of his own.5 It is worth exploring how the
relationship came to be at this place, with a desperate Kim Jong-Il completely reliant
upon a more and more hesitant provider, China. It is also necessary to understand the
changing Chinese priorities, for had China remained unchanged so too would the
relationship with North Korea, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may never
have come to fruition. The strength of ties can be partly indicated by the willingness of
China to support North Korea with not only aid but military force if necessary (a desire
that is waning at best). This is a completely different policy direction than when China

5

Scott Snyder, “Kim Jong-il Pays Tribute to Beijing – In His Own Way,” Comparative
Connections E-Journal Online (April 2006): 109,
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0601qchina_korea.pdf (accessed October 28, 2008).
4

first condoned the relationship by defending North Korea in the Korean War. It must be
noted throughout history that although China has supported North Korea, it has done so
primarily when it is in the best interest of the Chinese state or when China was too weak
to take a strong position. So, how did China get to be in a place where military defense
of North Korea is not considered a viable option? When were relationship ties first
solidified and how solid were the foundations of the partnership? Why is the relationship
currently so tense?

Choosing North Korea: Paramount Considerations
Chairman Mao controlled government decisions entirely leading up to the Korean
War.6 As Chairman Mao considered Chinese involvement, his philosophical mindset was
that “conflict didn’t require a solution, it was the solution to political problems. Hence
politics and international affairs were processes by which contradictions on any level
were resolved with conflict…[feeling that] conflict in human affairs was not only
inevitable but also desirable. Harmony was transitory and undesirable.”7 These
6

See Kim Jae Chang and William H. Mott IV, The Philosophy of Chinese Military
Culture (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006) for a very thorough explanation of the
development of the philosophical underpinnings of Chinese military culture. The time
period of Chairman Mao’s leadership and the centralization of decision-making are well
analyzed. See also the explanation of China’s external relations by Lowell Dittmer, “The
Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Regional Cooperation and its Enemies in
Northeast Asia: The Impact of Domestic Forces, ed. Edward Friedman and Sung Chull
Kim (London: Routledge, 2006), 103.
7

See The Nature of Conflict section of Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and
Strategy in Maoist China,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),
http://0-www.ciaonet.org/bianca.penlib.du.edu/book/katzenstein/katz07.html (accessed
November 13, 2008).
5

Realpolitik considerations, ensuring a degree of influence for the Chinese state, kept
North Korea as a priority on the agenda. Two threads running through Chinese strategic
thinking at this time were the concept of flexibility and “just war,”8 describing the
morally permissible killing of people for the “greater good.”9 Confucian standards, also
important, were responsible for Chairman Mao’s recognition that China’s Tao (military
capability) was inferior to that of the United States.10 Despite the unequal military
prowess, China’s intervention was felt to be righteous and triumphant.11 Sun Tzu
described flexibility as a goal in Chinese philosophical strategic involvement in war: “…
Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.”12

8

China could legitimately enter this war from a Chinese philosophical perspective
because according to Chinese “just war” theory, entering a conflict as the weaker nation
fighting the strong, automatically put China on the morally permissible side of the
conflict. For an extremely thorough discussion of Chinese philosophical analysis,
theoretical and philosophical, toward “just war” in Chinese theory and practice please
read Nadine Godehardt, “The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the
Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China,” GIGA German Institute of Global
and Area Studies Working Paper Series 88 (2008), 1-38,
http://ideas.repec.org/p/gig/wpaper/88.html (accessed September 29, 2008). Pay
particular attention to sections 2 and 3.
9

Johnston (1996): 231.

10

Chang and Mott (2006): 107.

11

Johnston (1996): 69-70. See also Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002): 4,
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/culture.pdf (accessed August 20, 2008).
12

See Sun Tzu, Art of War, Lionel Giles (Allandale Online Publishing: 1910). Online
access to the entire work can be found at http://www.yuni.com/library/suntzu.htm
(accessed September 4, 2008). Pay particular attention to Chapter 6: Weak Points and
Strong.

6

Therefore, a country must be prepared to deal with changing conditions at all times and
strategize to endure through them, all the while accomplishing the goals set.
China has shown through history to have a very adept ability to react to constantly
changing conditions, no doubt due to the constant need to weigh several competing
internal conditions with an equal set of compelling external concerns. In that vein of
thought, Sun Tzu’s philosophy of Tao (military capability) and Shih (national solidarity),
factored heavily into government considerations of Marxian philosophies.13 No doubt an
influence upon considerations for war was the tutoring of Guo Huaruo, who “stressed that
from a Marxist-Leninist perspective the notion of ‘not fighting and subduing the
enemy’—the core of the conventional interpretation of Sun Tzu—was un-Marxist.”14
This was a consideration that weighed heavily. Therefore, the Chinese government felt
China must enter the conflict: “American military actions threaten[ed] China’s industrial
base in Manchuria” and also “counterrevolutionaries could…undermine [China’s]
tenuous political control of the mainland.”15 Eventually, the Chinese government agreed

13

Chang and Mott (2006): 107.

14

Guo Huaruo, “’Sun Zi [sic] zhu’ qian yan” [Preface to “Translation and annotation of
Sun Zi”], in Gua Huaruo, Guo Huaruo junshi lunwen xuanji [Guo Huaruo’s Selected
Essays on Military Affairs] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1989): 427, as cited in
Nadine Godehardt, “Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy
of the People’s Republic of China,” GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Working Paper Series 88 (2008), 232. In this case, I had to rely upon Nadine
Godehardt’s translation and citation of this work, as I currently lack the Chinese language
ability to read and translate the text directly.
15

Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The
Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security 17, no. 1 (1992): 12257.

7

to enter the conflict, believing then, as it does now, that “enduring external threats to
China…emanat[e] from Washington” and must be taken care of despite the human and
monetary cost of war.16 The justification that Beijing entered the war on the side of the
just was icing on the cake in the pursuit of one of Beijing’s mot important priorities – a
buffer between China and the United States.17
In China’s decision to support North Korea, just war theory placed China on the
side of the defender, the morally correct side. This helped to mediate the fact that
China’s military weakness made all the more threatening the strength of the United States
on the battlefield. Another consideration is that China may have been predisposed to
military force at the time, perhaps due to the belief that war was not just inevitable, but
was to be pursued.18 Therefore, China was perhaps not so much defending North Korea
as much as the future of the Communist movement, seen as essential to China at the time.
It is this weakness, perhaps, which eventually led to the tense relations between North
Korea and China that can be seen today. Prior to 1978, China thought that war would

16

Andrew Scobell (2002): 27. See also Andrew Scobell’s “Soldiers, Statesman,
Strategic Culture and China’s 1950 Intervention in Korea,” Journal of Contemporary
China 8, no. 22 (1999): 477-497, for additional discussion of China’s rationale prior to
entry in the Korean War.
17

It is interesting to note here that India argued at this time in favor of China’s just entry
into the war, and that China was simply defending its border interests. Please see the
Truce Talks section of this article for a short discussion of India’s declarations regarding
China’s entry into the Korean War support of North Korea. Robert T. Oliver, “A Brief
for Korea,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 294 (July
1954), 35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1029226 (accessed October 15, 2005).
18

Scobell (2002): 109. Please consult this article as a whole for an excellent explanation
of the Chinese belief about the importance of war in international relations.

8

occur regardless, and that Chinese involvement was important to international
involvement,19 believing it to be a result of China equating Communist class struggle and
revolution with the modus operandi in the international system.20 Prevailing elements in
the decision were China’s need for a buffer zone, the manifestations of ideological
concerns into policy, and just war theory. These elements all played a role in justifying
for the Chinese government’s entry into the Korean War and defense of North Korea.

China, North Korea, and the International Community
Also of consideration was China’s positioning in the global community.
Partnering with North Korea would allow China to begin establishing legitimacy as a
country of rising influence, one the United States should be concerned about as a
potentially challenging power, or at least as a potentially equal member of the
international community.21 Chinese strategy toward North Korea evolved through several
cycles, beginning during the period of the Korean War in China’s policy of leaning to one
side.22 In the beginning of the Cold War, the constraints of the current international
19

Qin YaQing, “National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security interests: Three
Hypotheses on the Interaction between China and International Society,” in China and
Asia’s Security: China in the Globalized World Series 1 (Marshall Cavendish
International: Singapore, 2005): 39.
20

Qin (2005): 39.

21

Chang and Mott (2006): 109.

22

For a discussion of China’s “lean to one side” policy, see Joseph Y.S. Cheng and
Zhang Wankun. “Patterns and Dynamics of China’s International Strategic Behavior,” in
Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. Suisheng Zhao
(London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 180.

9

system gave China some recognition and influence, although at this point China’s role
was largely that of a bystander.
China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,23 were designated as a baseline
for interaction with international community members. These guidelines and principles
increasingly came to encompass the whole of China’s external relations: “mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each
other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.”24 In this
case, coupled with China’s current inward focus and revolutionary zeal, this treaty was
designed to ensure continued border security. In addition, China made several other
declarations of a desire for peace just after the Korean War, shifting attention from
external involvement in war to internal reform. The Constitution of 1954 emphasized "the
steadfast policy of our country in international affairs is to work hard for the lofty goal of
world peace and progress for mankind;” the current 1982 Constitution, equally affirms an
effort to "safeguard world peace and promote the cause of human progress."25 China’s
23

These principles were enacted specifically for China’s interactions with India at the
time, but it can be said that these principles characterize China’s policy toward all nations
since their establishment.
24

Jiang Zhuqing, “’Five Principles’ Still Shaping Global Peace,” China Daily Online,
June 29, 2004, Tuesday, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200406/29/content_343578.htm (accessed September 25, 2008).
25

“China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” White Paper (Beijing: Information Office of
the State Council of the People's Republic of China, November 1995) http://www.nti.org/
db/China/engdocs/whteppr.htm (accessed on September 14, 2008). Also see “China’s
Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation, White Paper,
(Beijing, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China,
September 2004) http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140320.htm (accessed
on September 15, 2008).

10

refocusing byline away from involvement in the Korean War toward internal reform was
in stark contrast to North Korea.
China’s involvement in the war satisfied the current ideological importance of the
Communist movement: “the cause of the revolution had all along developed out of
nothing, gone from small to big, developed as a brutal, difficult, death-defying struggle.26
However, the Communist ideology (and the global revolutions encouraged by the
movement) would not always be held in high esteem. China was beginning to shift
toward a line of strategic thinking that began to devalue a strategic partnership with North
Korea, a partnership that had been solidified in the first place to protect China as much as
or more than North Korea.

China’s Entry into the World Arena: The Post-Mao Era
Before the Korean War, China was suffering economically and experienced little
stability, internal or external. Due to this, leaders in Beijing seized upon the Korean War
as an opportunity to unite the people internally in the Chinese cause and pave the way for
internal growth and stability. By 1958, “the mainland of China is under the firm control
of a powerful government, making rapid progress in industrializing key sectors of its
economy, undergoing widespread social change under forced draft, and possessed of
Asia’s paramount military force.”27 As China began securing the underpinnings of
26

Liu Zhen, Liu Zhen Huiyilu,(Liu Zhen’s Memoirs), (Beijing: PLA Press, 1990), 337.

27

John M. H. Lindbeck, “The China Problem Today,” Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 321 (January 1959), 10,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1030975 (accessed on September 6, 2008).
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domestic growth and reform, external considerations were also made, but only pursued
when directly in line with Chinese national interest and upon the grounds that China
wanted no internal interference from an external power.
Prior to the 1970s it can generally be agreed upon that China was largely excluded
from inter-governmental organizations in any sphere. With China’s entry into the United
Nations in 1971, a great sign of complete reversal of the total isolationism of the 1966-68
Cultural Revolution, China began to seek equal recognition in the international arena on a
basic scale, solidifying its new direction away from North Korea. According to the
Chinese government, China did not seek to become a leader in the global community,
having no desire to make itself the target of any threatened nation: “China will never be a
superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.”28 Chinese
capabilities were still developing, and in no position to be challenged or targeted, and so
China was content to move slowly in policy, to ensure their growing position.
During Chairman Mao’s control of government policy, involvement in
organizations such as the United Nations, and policies of a similar nature (encouraging
external involvement) were discouraged. As China moved into the next decade, a new
principle of “seeking truth from facts (shishi quishi)” was established, moving away from

28

Albert Feuerwerker, “Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary
China,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 402, no. 1, (July
1972), 3, http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/402/1/1 (accessed on September 21,
2008). China’s actions post-Cold War, seeking a multilateral world order, can be
strongly seen in this 1972 statement. China utilized the conditions of the international
system after 1989 turning this thought into action through policy, explained in future
pages.

12

an ideological focus.29 Another key indicator of this shift is the disappearance by 1971 of
Lin Piao, author of the “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!” manifesto of 1965,
reflecting a new belief that his writing was “intellectually absurd and politically
impractical.”30 This demonstrates the mood in the political leadership was changing and
that new thinkers were being brought in for a different leadership direction and focus.
Leadership in Beijing shifted to the Central Committee Secretariat and State
Council, away from the politburo, meaning for the Chinese government a collectivization
of decision-making and less influence from the “whims of an individual leader.”31 This
new focus is described as “prompting the vision of a peaceful future world as the way
toward the promised land of modernity.”32 In this line of thinking, Chinese political
thought has moved from the Communist revolutionary line that war is inevitable, to a
preference of focused domestic development. In the words of Deng Xiaoping, China
should “bide [its] time and build up…capabilities.”33 With Beijing’s new Open Door

29

Samuel S. Kim, “Thinking Globally in Post-Mao China,” Journal of Peace Research
27, no. 2 (May 1990). The research of Samuel S. Kim provides excellent analysis of this
new principle to seek truth in facts rather than ideology.
30

Feuerwerker (1972): 10.

31

David L. Shambaugh, “China’s National Security Research Bureaucracy,” The China
Quarterly, no. 110 (June 1987), 284, http://www.jstor.org/stable/654000 (accessed on
September 30, 2008).
32

Kim (1990): 194.

33

Ralph D. Sawyer, “Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections,” Journal
of Military and Strategic Studies 9, no. 2 (Winter 2006/2007), 3,
www.jmss.org/2007/2007winter/articles/sawyer_cont-defence.pdf (accessed on
September 27, 2008).
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Policy, launched by Deng Xiaoping, China began to ascend to a new global and regional
stature as a country on the move. It is worth noting that North Korea during this period
maintained its prior status quo, refusing to change as China was with the times and
modernize. Whereas North Korea’s policy remained resistant to reform, China’s
flexibility through time meant that their government policies could change and shift with
the times in order to secure continued growth.
In the 1980s China began to get more proactive in these organizations, moving
beyond just membership into a more responsive role. China focused upon “systemmaintaining and system-exploiting…Beijing began to ask what IGOs could do for
China…and was more and more concerned with the stability of the existing capitalist
world system as a sine qua non for fueling its modernization drive.”34 Beijing only
increased its role in international organizations, in particular the United Nations, which
China declared a successful way to maintain stable world peace. China additionally
applied for membership on the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, with
the encouragement of the Soviet Union.35 North Korea, ever the reclusive nation, sought
none of these advances and continued the status quo, resisting reform and making its
relationship with China increasingly tense. Chinese policy had slowly made China part
of the international community in a responsible manner, taking part in international
institutions and paying more attention to the rules governing the global system. North
Korea continued to travel in the opposite direction and by this point both countries were

34

Kim (1990): 193.

35

Kim (1990): 196.
14

very far apart in terms of goals, policies, and strategic focus. Relations between the two
countries were tenuous at best, and China began to look elsewhere for partnership to
satisfy its goals post-Cold War.

15

CHAPTER 2

Change in the 1990s: A Fleeting Alliance
China’s focus shifted to a new “ism” between their entry into the Korean War and
the first North Korean nuclear declaration, refocusing upon the goal of capitalism instead
of communism: the “export of revolution” morphed into a solid “peace and development”
baseline, the beginnings of which could be seen in the Five Basic Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence. With a new economic focus, China sought partnerships with those who
would be most advantageous to the internal development of the country.36 The current
structure of the system also allowed China to begin building relations with others based
upon “‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful diplomacy,’ regardless of the ideology of the other
government.37 It was not a question of choosing sides as in the Cold War, but now a
focus on working together with anyone and everyone who could benefit China’s goal of
economic growth and power. Therefore, China integrated into international sphere
beyond membership in international organizations by engaging countries bilaterally and
multilaterally, at the cost of solid relations with North Korea.38 China was slowly setting
36

Dittmer (2006): 101.

37

Dittmer (2006): 109.

38

Stephanie Hsien and Chae-Jin Lee, “China's Two-Korea Policy at Trial: The Hwang
16

in, getting more comfortable, and finding its place in the new international order, and the
shift away from North Korea is a strong indicator of this taking place.39 The Chinese
government’s responsible policies were making North Korea’s irresponsible policies, and
failing economy as a result, all the more threatening to the growth and security of China.
China also began to restructure internal strategic priorities. Ideological
considerations took a backseat to rising issues of national development and security
initiatives.40 The new “ideology” for China was capitalism clothed in the rhetoric of a
Communist government. The political process in Beijing continued decentralization,
increasing policy dialogue in a multi-layered way, opening the political process in a way
that would have never been envisioned possible during the Mao period.41 Jiang Zemin
described this phenomenon, saying that “channels of decision making have become
increasingly diversified and complex—we find, for example, that the circle of decision
makers has grown progressively wider, as new talent and new ideas have been

Chang Yop Crisis,” Pacific Affairs 74, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), 321,
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030851X%28200123%2974%3A3%3C321%3ACTPATT
%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 (accessed on October 7, 2008).
39

Robert G. Sutter, “China’s Modernization and Asian Security,” in China’s Global
Presence: Economics, Politics, and Security, ed. David M. Lampton and Catherine H
Keyser (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Washington, 1988),
205.
40

Sutter (1988): 206.

41

David Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making process: Is it
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incorporated via the Leading Small Groups.”42 A key indicator of the Chinese
government taking the focus off inevitable war was the lessening influence of the
People’s Liberation Army in decision-making.43 Therefore, “while the ‘leaders of Mao’s
generation were willing to use force to serve China’s security, and more broadly, foreign
policy goals whenever necessary…[recently] in most cases, China sent strong warnings
or protests or engaged in negotiations’ prior to employing armed force.”44 Affirming a
shift in China’s policy, Deng Xiaoping said, “We need at least twenty years of peace to
concentrate on our domestic development.”45 China in the early 1990s sought to find
itself, determining national priorities and dealing with an entirely new power alignment
The Chinese government response after Tiananmen Square revealed a struggling
and changing China, responding to international pressure and punishments with good
behavior, seeking stronger integration and a more positive perception in the international
community. The violent oppression of the protestors at Tiananmen Square was
disastrous for positive Chinese perception worldwide, and reflected a new era in which
China, to benefit and use the system, must also accept the social and moral
responsibilities accorded with membership. The international community response to
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the actions of the Chinese government and PLA were devastating – economic sanctions
and diplomatic ostracism. Beijing leadership as a result began even more solidly turning
the focus inward upon peaceful development, with a renewed “emphasis on ‘peaceful
evolution’ [that] bespoke a basic reevaluation of the opening policy, leading to the
formulation of ‘identity realism’: economic opening was profitable and would continue,
[with]…greater emphasis on patriotic education, including reincorporation of preRevolutionary Chinese history…shift[ing] the focus from glorious communist revolution
to the foregoing national humiliation [guochi].”46 Economic development and regional
and global security considerations had officially taken the place of Communist
revolution. Capitalism, the enemy of China’s Communist movement in the 1950s, was
now the movement of choice.
Post-Cold War, Chinese external relationships were cultivated with a variety of
countries in the international arena, regardless of ideology or geopolitical positioning:
“The acceptance and promotion of partnerships among major boundaries reflect an
attempt on the part of China to redefine its position in the new international strategic
pattern. The partnerships also reveal a strategic idea offered by China as an emerging
major power in the post-Cold War era.47 At this point, considering the Chinese
relationship with North Korea, particularly the resistance encountered in Pyongyang at
the mention of internal reform or cooperation with the international system, was
continuing to place a lot of strain upon the relationship. North Korea’s nuclear
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declaration in particular, potentially destabilizing the region, terrified a new China
desperate to maintain regional stability for continued development.
Chinese-North Korean relations struggled throughout the first nuclear crisis but
were shored up because China was also dealing with an internal crisis (Tiananmen) that
had called into question successful transition into the international system. China
therefore was not in a position to pressure and punish North Korea in a serious way.48
Doing so risked Pyongyang continuing irresponsible behavior and doing something to
punish China for that action. The destabilization of the shared border or, the worst case,
the region, was too high a price to pay for China. As Chinese policy showed a tendency
toward increased responsibility in the international arena concerning nuclear weapons
and material by signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical
Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Pyongyang
continued in the opposite vein, eventually pulling out of the NPT to pursue weapons
development. China as a signatory to the CTBT is a key development, as the Chinese
government had previously refused to sign the document in order to finish (according to
the completion standards of leaders in Beijing) their nuclear testing. It is also
“particularly significant given the importance China attaches to its nuclear arsenal as a
symbol of its great power status and as the ultimate guarantor of Chinese sovereignty
against ‘nuclear blackmail and hegemony.’”49 This new responsibility reflects the
48
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Chinese understanding of nuclear weapons not just as a method of shoring up superpower
status, but also that they can be a destabilizing force should they end up in the wrong
hands. Just because China has nuclear weapons does not mean China wants other
countries to have them as well, particularly not their irresponsible partner, North Korea.

Sinuiji Special Administrative Zone: China Says No
China had no problem showing North Korea who was in control when it came to
the Sinuiji Special Administrative Region. A growing economic opportunity with high
hopes on the China-North Korean border, had been developing between the two nations.
The idea behind this cooperation was encouraging mutually beneficial reform on the part
of North Korea. China had contributed to the project, investing as a potential way to
open North Korean to outside investment and economic reform. Here, the Chinese
government tried to pass along to North Korea through joint policy the new feeling of
responsibility that China espoused in policy.
Demonstrating, though, that little in North Korea had changed, Kim Jung-il
selected as manager a man known more for his ability to deliver favors to Kim than his
business prowess, Yang Bin.50 As a response to questionable business practices, China
jailed Yang Bin, refusing to be associated with this corrupt and irresponsible choice by
the North Korean government. Also plausible for severing association with this project
was Pyongyang’s lack of information given to the Chinese government: This “gives
50
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credence to views that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have deteriorated
markedly…as Kim Jong-il has evidently focused his primary time and attention on
wooing Russian President Vladimir Putin at the expense of relations with Beijing.”51 The
Sinuiji Special Administrative Region, with its promised economic reforms, stands
contrary to Pyongyang’s nuclear behavior. It does continue to shore up the belief that
North Korea does not want to change in the international system, but rather continue to
take that system hostage, in a sense, to remain the same country it had always been. The
Chinese government could not put up with this behavior.
Describing the differences evident at the Chinese-North Korean border, a picture
emerges describing the changes that have occurred on the Chinese side and the lack of
change on the North Korean side: "thirty years ago, the two sides of the river were
virtually identical, but now, it seems they couldn't be more different.’ China had
incorporated tourist sites along its border;52 North Korea had done no such thing,
remaining ever suspicious and preparing for the next inevitable outbreak of war.53 The
dismal state of the North Korean economy, the result of continued pursuit of “Communist
utopia,” is in stark contrast to China’s rapid growth, and speaks to Beijing’s abandonment
of Marx.54 China sought to work with North Korea in one of a couple areas to encourage
51
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reform, and North Korea’s desperation for some flow of income encouraged the
cooperation of leaders in Pyongyang, but only to a certain extent. North Korea would not
change or reform for economic success, whereas China would. The partnership of one
very flexible country and one very inflexible nation could not last.

From Pyongyang With Love: More of the Same
The threat perception in Pyongyang is a cyclical process and North Korea creates
the conditions that cause increased suspicion. North Korea’s threat perception and
wariness is heightened in response to the targeting of the global community, and North
Korea’s continued irresponsible behavior continues to make it a target, which in turn
raises Pyongyang’s perception of threats, etc. The cycle just continues over time. China
does not want attention drawn to itself for negative or destabilizing action and a solid
relationship with North Korea could suggest in some way that China agreed with
Pyongyang’s policies. Beijing though could not deal with North Korea with ease or with
a consistent hard-line approach, instead reacting as a result of changing conditions, the
focus though always being Chinese economic growth. The risk in dealing with North
Korea is huge and the danger posed to Chinese internal growth very real, so China had to
tread carefully when dealing with Pyongyang. This proved to be a very delicate
balancing act.
This tension explains why Beijing was hesitant to take a hard-line approach to the
North Korean nuclear ambitions. Instead, China took a more moderate approach in
dealing with North Korea. An example of this is Wu Jianmin’s statement that China
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seeks a resolution through “patient consultations,” and that “evidence that North Korea
had nuclear weapons was ‘not convincing’. …We have held all along that dialogue is
more effective than pressure. To bring pressure to bear is not appropriate now.”55 China,
familiar with the results of economic sanctions from personal experience after
Tiananmen, and recognizing that the North Korean economy was barely surviving as it
was, did not wholeheartedly endorse economic sanctions against Pyongyang.56 China
could not afford to increase the suffering in North Korea and suffer increased North
Korean dependency. China’s reluctance was also the result of hesitancy to allow foreign
bodies and countries to have influence domestically in North Korea; by extension, this
implied that perhaps internal issues in China could be dealt with by outside interference.57
Domestic development and economic growth was also of paramount concern as China
became comfortable with its position in dealing with North Korea.58 The Chinese
government did not want to anger the leaders in Pyongyang and so China abstained from
voting after Hans Blix issued a report to the UN urging North Korea to work with the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the General Assembly supported the motion in
a 140-0 vote.59
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Beijing’s attitude toward North Korea increased in tension as China began to
learn the rules of the game and include itself into the global community. As China began
to experience the economic partnership benefits of peaceful cooperation, the Chinese
government no doubt would have liked North Korea to move in the same direction,
emphasizing the political and economic benefits of peaceful engagement. This policy had
a two-fold purpose, stabilize North Korea’s aggressive policies and decrease North
Korea’s present and future dependency upon China. Pyongyang disagreed and continued
their pursuit. China slowly increased its power in the system,60 and enjoyed the benefits,
China slowly and incrementally began to put pressure upon North Korea to do the same.
Beijing did not want to continue to lose face over Pyongyang’s irresponsible behavior.
China dealt with many different issues in this period, acclimatizing to the
international system, reevaluating national and international strategic goals, and finally,
how to balance these new focuses with a waning desire to partner with North Korea.
China at the beginning of the 1990s was not in a strong enough position to place real
pressure upon Pyongyang, 61 but this would not always be the case.

North Korea: Pushing China’s Buttons
A new regional and domestic role for China is revealed through participation in
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the Six-Party Talks. China’s new focus for the North Korean alliance is far more
indicative of desiring responsible membership in the global community, with pragmatism
playing a far larger role.62 Essentially, “it has become one of China’s important strategic
tasks to maintain the stability of the international society and the region where it is
located. China regards international society as the important guarantee of China’s
national interests rather than a threat to China’s security.”63 The Chinese government
post-Cold War, recognized that the international system has benefits, and tried to take
advantage, stating that countries “should seek converging points in their common
interests, expand mutually beneficial cooperation and work together to take up the
challenge facing mankind for survival and development.”64 Pyongyang has been
nowhere near as successful as Beijing in normalizing relations with the European Union
members and Russia as China develops stronger relations on a global scale.65 This should
come as no surprise considering North Korea’s repeated irresponsible nuclear actions,
threatening to destabilize the region and angering nations around the world.
China furiously responded to North Korea’s nuclear test, changing to an attitude
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of punishment instead of diplomacy.66 The nuclear tests were a loss of face and a “slap in
the face.”67 Threats to China’s international and domestic perception at this point were
unacceptable. China responded strongly, supporting UN Security Council Resolution
1718, and imposing sanctions upon Pyongyang, a position China was unwilling and
unable to take a decade earlier.68 China’s power and perception in the international arena
is rising, as its relationship with North Korea declines. Patience also seems to be wearing
thin among some Chinese leaders with North Korea's aggressive military and failing
economy, refusing to condone the situation with a personal visit: "A delegation…
including high-ranking [Communist] Party officials…rejected an invitation to visit
Pyongyang."69 The continued nuclear situation was the straw that broke the camel’s
back, and Beijing’s annoyance is made clear through policy. Also clear is China’s new
role in the international system as a major player.

China Pushes Back: A Hard-Line Policy for North Korea
Beijing’s efforts to encourage North Korea into a position with a greater stake and
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heightened responsibility reflect China’s growing ability and power when compared with
the response to North Korea’s first nuclear crisis. Beijing has been applying pressure
behind the scenes in Pyongyang to decrease North Korea’s economic and political
dependence,70 an attitude reversal from the first round of talks in the early 1990s
regarding North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and program. China’s effort in the Six-Party
Talks now is regarded far more highly than in the early 1990s; in particular, this serves as
an indication of the importance of these talks in Chinese political affairs, Beijing
assembled hundreds of experts to work on drafts of the agreements.71 China is
approached as not just an equal power in these talks, but as a very important member of
talks, a position relished in Beijing. Additionally, leaders in Beijing encouraged SixParty Talk members to provide Pyongyang with face-saving measures to return to the
talks after negative rhetoric from the United States labeling North Korea as an “outpost of
tyranny” and Kim Jung Il a “tyrant.”72 China’s efforts have been beneficial, as North
Korea is more involved in these talks than during the first nuclear crisis in the early
1990s, even if that involvement leads to more frustration at times than positive results.

70

Fravel and Medeiros (2003): 1. The authors discuss Beijing’s hard-line approach to
North Korean nuclear misbehavior. Recently, China “had boldly stepped into the fray,
suspending crucial oil shipments to North Korea, sending high-level envoys to
Pyongyang, and shifting troops around the Sino-Korean border. …And China has not let
up the pressure since.” The article continues outlining the ways China is taking a far
more involved role in regional and international arenas far bolder than before, an
indicator of the success of Beijing’s economic reform and development.
71

Kim (2006): 68.

72

“Rice Names ‘Outposts of Tyranny,” BBC News Channel Online, January 19, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4186241.stm (accessed September 6, 2008).

28

At this time, the beginning of the 21st century, China is described to have made
“a monumental contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia and the
world over and the sound development of international relations. Peace and development
remain the overriding themes of the times.”73 Involved globally now, and gaining
legitimacy, China focuses on a variety of domestic and international issues at all levels.
Finally, the most telling sign of the decay of the China-North Korea relationship,
indications exist suggesting Beijing would be unwilling to support North Korea were it
attacked by another nation, part of Article II of the 1961 treaty with North Korea.74
China does not need or want regional instability, particularly as considerable growth is
the new Chinese theme, nor would the Chinese government ever risk China’s growing
position to fight a war with little reward for the winner.
China’s participation in the Six-Party Talks is a key indication of the regional role
potential for China. Fairly recently, “President Hu urged relevant parties to continue to
strengthen coordination and cooperation, push forward the talks and strive for the gradual
establishment of a mechanism for peace and security in Northeast Asia.” 75 It can be
safely assumed that this hint toward a mechanism in Northeast Asia, while it could mean
an encouragement to solidify the Six-Party Talks membership into a formal, permanent
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framework, could also mean the development of an organization in which China plays a
more central, controlling role (see Chapter Four). President Hu spoke further, indicating
a strong interest in increased Russian involvement and partnership.76 It is left to the
reader to wonder if, perhaps, this was merely a reference to a potential new role for the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization to fulfill. Could this be the case? It is very unclear,
and differing Chinese and Russian goals about the future of the Korean Peninsula, would
seem to make this unlikely. Despite other similar challenges, Russia and China have
overcome many impasses in order to work together successfully, succeeding where North
Korea has failed. China has learned to compromise in order to accomplish its goals and
work with others in the current system.
China’s increased participation in the Six-Party Talks and increasing participation
in international organizations (governmental and non-governmental), reflects a desire to
become part of the system while encouraging North Korea to do the same (whether or not
leaders in Pyongyang want to join). The Talks could not be without China, as Beijing
convinced North Korea to join and has maintained pressure upon the Pyongyang
government to prevent North Korea from disappearing.77 It is possible that this may rein
in some of North Korea’s rogue state actions.78 It is also possible that China’s regional
76
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influence is overblown and should not be invested in too highly. China’s level of
influence is debatable.
Beijing does obviously have influence, as one main provider of aid to North
Korea, although the level of influence is up for debate. Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill has described China as “key” to the success of
the Six Party Talks.79 A final point, “who has more potential leverage to bring North
Korea in line – in ways that could dramatically expand China’s regional influence and
“space,” if indeed a U.S. troop presence in South Korea proves unsustainable – than
Beijing?”80 Clearly, China seeks benefit at home by becoming involved in the process
forcing North Korea to be more responsible. These benefits come in the form of
continued economic growth, enhanced international prestige, recognition that China is a
necessary power player, and a separation of China from North Korea, so China no longer
has to suffer when Pyongyang’s irresponsible policies are played out. The Chinese
government has successfully positioned China as a successful power who will continue to
play a role far into the future.
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discussion where international relations and policy are concerned. Meetings and
discussion about various international security topics are held regularly, encouraging and
opening consultative channels, “decentraliz[ing] the foreign policy network and
increase[ing] the diversity of opinions reaching the top leaders.”81 The top leadership
though has become more collectivized.82 Along with the pluralization of global
involvement and diplomacy, Beijing has experienced a similar phenomenon in the
decision-making process. This is a variance from the past when the paramount leader
possessed total control over the decision-making process, limiting consultations (if any)
to the few closest, most trusted advisors. President Hu Jintao does not make decisions
completely alone as Chairman Mao largely did, but consults other bodies for opinions
and recommendations.83 The actual effect these policies have upon the decision-making
process is indeterminable, but the fact remains that they are solicited, reflecting a definite
change from past policy. Chairman Mao never felt pressure to even give lip service to
the process of consultations in decision-making but President Hu Jintao does. Now,
“important decisions are made after soliciting opinions from democratic parties and
people with no party affiliation.”84 This change indicates the growing outward focus of
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Chinese government policy, and a (however superficial) acceptance of the responsibilities
associated with the international system.
To accomplish its goals, China is opening up in more ways than originally
anticipated and the effect upon the highest levels shows this. China now values more
regional security, economic advancement and prosperity,85 as well as enhancing its
reputation. Leaders in Beijing, “openly admit that China’s development goal is ‘a rich
state and a strong army’ (fu guo qiang bing).” 86 To contribute to the attainment of this
goal, China began emphasizing the peaceful intentions of the country, saying that a
growing China does not pose a threat.87 This pronouncement seeks no doubt to prevent
any anti-China alliances, and to serve as a form of deterrence. This new direction for
Chinese government policy manifested itself in relations with other countries as well in
post-Cold War.
Although China’s relationship with North Korea shifted from that of siblings to a
parent chastising a disobedient teenager, China still engages North Korea. Leaders in
Beijing recognize that they cannot afford not to talk to their neighbor, however unruly.
Although North Korea is of less importance as a buffer zone and is now more of a
liability, China maintains the cost of relations to protect regional stability. So, in a way,
North Korea remains a high strategic priority on China’s list, but at a much greater cost
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and with far more limited benefits. China has found a far more stable and secure way to
maintain the strategic buffer zone and concurrently pursue economic growth and
development – developing relations with Russia in a multi-layered way unlike that of the
Sino-North Korean relationship. The Sino-North Korean alliance failed as China rose
and strategic goals changed. The Chinese government now set its eyes upon cooperation
with Russia to attain post-Cold War goals.

34

CHAPTER 3

A Bold Outward Direction: Sino-Russian Relations
When the Cold War ended and the international system began to adjust, China
assessed the situation and became alarmed at the growth of a uni-polar system. In
response, policymakers in Beijing began formulating policies to counterbalance the
growing weight of the United States in the international arena. This perspective is best
described by Yan Xuetong, director of Tsinghua University’s Institute of International
Studies, who unabashedly said, “the world should prepare for a uni-polar world order and
a unilateral US global strategy. The US is the world's only superpower, [and] pulling out
of the ABM shows that they know they don't need to care about what others say.”88
Spurred on by a desire, at minimum, for continued equal recognition with other countries,
China began moving in a direction that ideally, over time, would allow the country to
play a significant regional and international role. China did not want this role to extend
only to the political or military arenas, however.
In this new era, soft power can be as powerful as hard power, and should be used
88
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as often if not more. According to Yan Xuetong, soft power is “the ability to mobilize a
country, both internally and externally,” and hard power is defined as military power.89
The Chinese government has been working hard to increase the presence and power of
the country globally through alternate methods such as cultural exchanges, language
study, increasing tourism domestically and abroad, to name a few. Internally, China has
continued instituting a strong government to unify the people and encouraging pride in
the growing nation and its potential, to discourage factions that may wish to cause unrest
or challenge the status quo. In developing legal structures internally and regionally with
neighbors, China also attains the good graces and assistance of other nations, allowing
the Chinese government to more easily maintain control of the internal population. In the
case of border disputes or problems (to be detailed far more specifically in further
sections), instead of pulling out hard power options, Beijing can engage in dialogue or
rely upon social institutions to smooth over the tenuous area/issue. It is with these goals
in mind that China sought economic development as well, for a prosperous happy people
with opportunity benefiting from the system is far less likely to fragment and seek a
change in that system. Though the system is largely still under development, and should
not be confused with China’s growing economic power, according to Yan.90
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Also in the post-Cold War period, China began even more swiftly moving in the
direction of economic pursuits. After all, even China’s Communist Party has “long since
discarded Marxist interests as the organization discusses ways of embracing
entrepreneurs into its membership.”91 A new direction and partnership in the post-Cold
War era are needed to solidify China’s broader regional focus, the provision of security,
development opportunities, and regional ties of the non-North Korean type. Russia
provided this opportunity, building relations in the post-Cold War era upon a new base of
equality, seeing China as a partner instead of simply a tributary state part of the
communist movement and, unlike North Korea, contributing to the stability of the region
and providing a counter balance to the influence of the United States (a role previously
filled by North Korea).
At the end of the Cold War, as the Sino-North Korean relationship took a turn for
the worse, China’s relations with Russia did the opposite. Challenged by the collapse of
the global communist movement, the Tiananmen sanctions and diplomatic isolation,
China sought a new avenue to begin opening the closed doors of diplomatic relations
with others. China found the answer in Russia, a country that had equally experienced
the collapse of the communist movement and suffered economically. From Moscow’s
“most worrisome ideological opponent, China has become in the post-Cold War
international order a valued strategic partner.”92 From the perspective of the governments
91
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in Beijing, the same sentiment is accorded for the post-Cold War years.93 The
relationship between China and Russia, initially a politically beneficial relationship,
developed into a much more demanding and rewarding partnership, with multilayered
frameworks for cooperation.
In solidifying ties and taking the first steps toward a regional, multilateral
apparatus, China and Russia recognized that in order for their countries to function best,
all abilities should be equal at economic, social, and legal status: “Establishing a
harmonious society and increasing government political ability mobilization requires
reform of social institutions to make them compatible with the increase in production
capacity.”94 Essentially, growth will only continue as long as all elements of a country
are supportive, contributive, and grow alongside economic progress. Each country
worked to improve internally to better growth, but found that even faster, more stable
growth could be found in partnership. The Chinese government had long recognized
that an internally united people would allow for greater continued growth and worked to
stem the problems associated with minorities seeking change. Russia and China
cooperated here with enlightened self-interest, enacting policies to benefit themselves and
their partner internally.
China did not stand to benefit alone from this relationship, as Russia too wanted
to increase its regional and international positioning in the post-Cold War era. In 1996,
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with the induction of Evgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister in Russia, the prior more
pro-Western policies were dropped in favor of the cultivation of partnerships with China
and India. Encouragement of an alliance between the three countries was on the agenda,
but particularly with China.95 Elizabeth Wishnick, an analyst of Sino-Russian relations,
describes Russian interests from an interview with Prime Minister Igor Ivanov, where he
said that Russia has proven to be “[eager] to promote its interests in Asia.”96 In this new
system, although the recognized superpower was the United States, the potential existed
for a more extensive multi-polar opportunity. Other commonalities existed between
Russian and Chinese policy interests and strategic goals. Some of these common
interests included opposition to national missile defense (NMD, mainly American), North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) growth, and finally “intervention in the Kosovo
conflict served to shore up Sino-Russian strategic coordination and military
cooperation.”97 Russia and China recognized this and seized upon it in their interactions,
initially politically and eventually in a multi-layered context.
Increasing trade between Russia and China was one of the goals during the late
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1990s, stabilizing and bettering ties as well as creating opportunity. In 1997, for
example, Russia and China signed an agreement permitting Russian construction of a $3
billion nuclear power plant in east China.98 Cooperating in markets such as energy, arms
sales, investment, and the purchasing of property in each country increases the ties as
well as the exposure each country has in the other. In 1999, the Asian Financial Crisis
encouraged both countries to scale down their cooperation, but not end it. They simply
had to be more creative to maximize benefit for cost. This thought process, coupled with
the increased economic participation, has also led to increased strategic partnerships in
the security and political arenas. The encouragement of a multi-polar world where no
hegemonic power has the ability for singular control (i.e. the United States) is of
particular concern for both China and Russia.99 In this goal, the betterment of the partner
can allow the other nation to succeed as well, for if Russia or China rises faster than the
other, it may create a new hegemonic system, which is not the goal of their partnership.
So, each cooperates to keep the other partner in check, even while contributing to that
partner’s global and internal success and stability.
China and Russia also cooperated in the area of military exercises and arms sales.
Beginning in the early 1990s, both countries began shifting the focus of their
political/economic alliance to, slowly, that of a military alliance as well. China and
Russia’s goal of countering U.S. influence would be unsuccessful were buildup of
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military lacking as well. China’s desire to counter U.S. military hegemony is so strong
that China, normally secretive even to allies concerning military activities and
capabilities, has been working with Russia strongly to accomplish this. The Chinese
government alone does not share this belief,100 but is characteristic as well of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). According to an advisor to the Pentagon, “Communist China
views the U.S. as an ‘inevitable foe’ and is preparing for a military confrontation.”101
Russia has been selling to China submarines, missiles, fighters, destroyers, and strategic
aircraft used for “troop movement, air-to-air refueling and AWACS-type duties.”102 This
cooperation is not only involving the trade of arms. Military cooperation in the upper
levels of both countries’ military establishments, lends credence to the idea that this
partnership is one of strength, with much potential for an even stronger future. This is
not to say, however, that the countries will combine forces and fight as one (with united
strategic goals) anytime soon. These confidence-building measures are indicators of
what could be in the future, but what is also not here now.
Strategic military arms purchases from Russia aid the Chinese in their goal of a
targeted military buildup, focusing upon being technologically elite and not manpower
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buildup in traditional terms: “In the past three years, the People's Liberation Army has
moved quickly to implement a new military strategy that relies heavily on this kind of
technological know-how. In the future it even wants to add such high-tech gizmos as
laser beams to zap U.S. satellites that monitor battlefields, bombs emitting
electromagnetic pulses that blind missile guidance systems, and computer attacks that
could put U.S. command networks on the fritz.”103 As China pursues the goals of
modernization in military terms, its partnership with Russia gives it increased access to
hardware as well as additional political power from an ally also interested in power of its
own. It is harder for the U.S. to criticize Chinese government policy when Russia is
standing not too far behind. China’s targeted military buildup is complimented by
partnership with Russia, and in turn, Russia benefits monetarily from the sales of its
weapons and machinery.
When President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, he did so at a time when
Chinese and Russian concerns had never been so aligned. Agreements had been signed
enhancing the economic cooperation and benefit for both countries, building trust and
creating opportunity for added growth and stability. Both countries had unstable regions
seeking independence and both countries desired to maintain internal stability in the (thus
far) stable regions. China and Russia have supported each other’s regional interests when
it comes to issues both countries view as domestic concerns not for international
involvement. Specifically, “Chinese leaders supported Russia’s effort to subdue the
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Chechnya militarily, and Russia has firmly backed China’s position on Taiwan.”104 Not
long after this, in 2001, both countries signed the Treaty on Good Neighborliness,
Friendship, and Cooperation, a significant move toward solidifying positive political
relations (in 1980 during the Cold War China had refused to renew this treaty).105

The Here and Now of Sino-Russian Cooperation
The current financial crisis has also encouraged increased cooperation for Russia
and China, bi-laterally and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Comments
from the top leadership in Beijnig support this strategic focus: “Chinese President Hu
Jintao said [recently] that China and Russia should strengthen strategic coordination at a
time when the global political and economic structures are undergoing the most profound
changes since the end of the Cold War.”106 Continuing to show flexibility with changing
conditions as well as a recognition that the system is changing. China is playing a role in
this shift, and is seeking to understand these changes in order to take advantage of them
for the betterment of Chinese growth and establishment in the world order. Chinese and
Russian cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a key example. The
next chapter explores the multilateral and multilayered cooperation in the SCO, from
inception to the present, focusing upon how the organization services China’s new needs
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as well as continuing to serve the purpose of the old strategic concerns.
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CHAPTER 4

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Basic History
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization traces its origins to the Shanghai Five
organization, formed in April of 1996, but could be said to trace back even further to the
blossoming relations between China and Russia. The organization was founded
recognizing three main goals of combating terrorism, extremism and separatism.
Original members China, Russia, Kazahkstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan, met in 1996 and
1997 to “strengthen confidence-building and disarmament in the border regions…
[signing] the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions and the Treaty on
Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions.”107 Membership at this time made sense
in that all states shared a border with China. In January 2001 Uzbekistan applied for
membership and joined the Shanghai Five. The group was officially renamed the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a result, and based its activities upon two main
documents, the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO and the SCO Charter.
These basic tenets of the organization are fairly flexible and vague, allowing the SCO to
adapt to future concerns and deal with current problems. As membership grew, so did
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the purposes and goals of the organization, with specific purposes becoming unclear.
According to the Charter of the SCO, the organization has various diverse and
multilayered “goals and tasks”, “principles”, and “areas of cooperation”, all of which
service all members and reflect the designing hang of China. The purposes of the SCO
are:
“to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness [sic] between
the member States; to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the
maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region
and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic
international order; to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism and extremism
in all their manifestations, to fight against illicit narcotics and arms trafficking
and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also
illegal migration; to encourage the efficient regional cooperation in such
spheres as politics, trade and economy, defense, law enforcement,
environment protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy,
transport, credit and finance, and also other spheres of common interest; to
facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural
development in the region through joint action on the basis of equal
partnership for the purpose of a steady increase of living standards and
improvement of living conditions of the peoples of the member States; to
coordinate approaches to integration into the global economy; to promote
human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international
obligations of the member States and their national legislation; to maintain
and develop relations with other States and international organizations [sic];
to cooperate in the prevention of international conflicts and in their peaceful
settlement; to jointly search for solutions to the problems that would arise in
the 21st century.”108
Several of the described purposes of the SCO are identical to the Chinese government’s
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, which direct China’s independent relations
with other countries around the world. As an establishing member of the SCO, and one
of the most powerful, China has the ability to shape and direct the future of the SCO.
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The Chinese government has, in this design, created an organization that will act in a
manner similar to that of China itself, and therefore will act to further the goals of Beijing
in a way that China alone cannot. Several countries working together in a regional
organization holds much more potential future power and has far greater ability to
stabilize a region in desperate need of assistance.
The principles upon which the SCO was founded uphold priorities similar to that
of the Chinese government as well. The principles of the SCO are:
“Mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States
and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal
affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking
no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas; equality of all member
States, search of common positions on the basis of mutual understanding and
respect for opinions of each of them; gradual implementation of joint
activities in the spheres of mutual interest; peaceful settlement of disputes
between the member States; SCO being not directed against other States and
international organizations [sic]; prevention of any illegitimate acts directed
against the SCO interests; implementation of obligations arising out of the
present Charter and other documents adopted within the framework of SCO,
in good faith.”109
The Chinese government has long sought equal treatment when involved in the
international arena.110 Further, since moving out of prior isolationist policies, China has
long maintained that domestic issues should be resolved without outside interference,
from another country or any inter-country organization. According to Chinese Foreign
Minister Li Zhaoxing, "It can be imagined and understood that any country should not
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interfere in the internal affairs of another country."111 Specific examples where the
Chinese government maintains this rhetoric is when speaking of Tibet or Taiwan, which
the Chinese government feels are internal issues to be resolved by China alone. Within
the SCO, the main areas of cooperation are:
“Maintenance of peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region;
search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest,
including issues arising within international organizations [sic] and international
for a [sic]; development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly
counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism, illicit narcotics and arms
trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and
also illegal migration; coordination of efforts in the field of disarmament and
arms control; support for, and promotion of regional economic cooperation in
various forms, fostering favorable environment for trade and investments with a
view to gradually achieving free flow of goods, capitals, services and
technologies; effective use of available transportation and communication
infrastructure, improvement of transit capabilities of member States and
development of energy systems; sound environmental management, including
water resources management in the region, and implementation of particular
joint environmental programs and projects; mutual assistance in preventing
natural and man-made disasters and elimination of their implications; exchange
of legal information in the interests of development of cooperation within SCO;
development of interaction in such spheres as science and technology,
education, health care, culture, sports and tourism. The SCO member States
may expand the spheres of cooperation by mutual agreement.”112
These goals are congruous with the membership of the organization, all focused upon
countries with regional membership, perhaps explaining why the United States was
denied observer status with the SCO.
Current membership in the SCO consists of China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, detailed in the beginning of the SCO history.
There are additional countries that have special status within the SCO and participate, and
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although they have no power within the organization they share certain benefits of
regional economic and security cooperation by participating. India, Iran, Mongolia, and
Pakistan have observer status, Afghanistan is an occasional attendee, and Turkmenistan is
an occasional observer. Occasional representatives from the Commonwealth of
Independent States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations also attend sessions
of the SCO. Belarus has also applied for membership status, however there is no
guarantee of success due to the country’s location in Europe. Although the SCO
meetings include many more countries than the official six member countries, there are
no official or pending plans to expand the organization. There is also no legal framework
currently existing within the SCO design to allow for the admittance of additional
membership.113 The desire of member states to develop framework for expansion is also
questionable, as increased membership could make the organization unwieldy and unable
to accomplish goals or remain focused.
The SCO holds annual summits in rotating country capitals, moving in
alphabetical order according to the countries’ names in Russian language.114 Summits
began in China in 2001. Members have also participated in military exercises called
Peace Missions. The first occurred in 2003, phase one in Khazahkstan and phase two in
China, and the second exercises were held in 2007. Joint exercises were also held
between China and Russia in 2005, although outside of the SCO framework. They are
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significant, however, because the success of these operations led to increased confidence
and contributed to increased SCO military cooperation and activity. Russia’s Permanent
Representative to the SCO, Grigory Logninov in 2006 said the SCO does not seek to
become a NATO-esque military cooperation organization; however, because the SCO
serves to protect the security of its members, and is aware of the potentially devastating
effects of "terrorism, extremism and separatism," member states are required to cooperate
in military affairs.115 Therefore, military cooperation is basically an extension of
economic and political cooperation, ensuring that the latter two continue unabated and
with greater success.

What is the SCO?: Through the Rhetoric
While the SCO’s intentions and plans may be helpful to members, it remains
ambiguous to outside observers. This in itself is indicative of China’s involvement, as
China is not well known for its transparency or clear intentions when making decisions or
policies. In this case it works to China’s favor, for the organization is not locked in one
key direction; rather, it can be molded and changed as needs are to be met over time.
Evan Feigenbaum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs,
addressed the SCO with more questions than answers: “What does the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization actually do to promote enduring cooperation in this part of the
world? Is it a security group? A trade bloc? Something else? What is the Shanghai
115

Iza D, “SCO Gets Ready for Joint Military Exercise,” World Student Press Agency,
August 20, 2007, http://www.studentpa.info/spip.php?article248 (accessed September 18,
2008).

50

Cooperation Organization members’ vision of their own organization?”116 From current
constructs, the organization serves its exact purpose – to remain small enough to address
the concerns of member states while retaining the potential to become a larger, more
powerful organization in the future. With an unclear purpose, it leaves every door open
for new opportunities, projects, communication, and cooperation of any kind. “What
should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s agenda be? Ask a Russian, ask a
Chinese, ask a Kyrgyz, ask an Uzbek. You will hear four different answers. Some want
to focus on security, some on economics, some on the so-called “three evils,” and others
on pressuring international non-governmental organizations.”117 This is particularly
important in the post-Cold War world where states are not the only entities posing threats
and offering new opportunities for success, be it economic, social, political, etc. If the
purpose is indeed to counter U.S. influence in the region, then broad, sweeping goals
allows the SCO to accomplish this goal in any sphere and through any means necessary,
assuming the member states can continue to cooperate and accomplish the mission. Thus
far the member states have been concentrating efforts on a small scale, slowly building
confidence between members and allowing the organization to continue to develop in
accordance with stated goals.
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The SCO: China’s New Problem Solving Calculus
“As proven by history, force cannot fundamentally resolve disputes and
conflicts, and the security concept and regime based on the use of force and
threat to use force can hardly bring about lasting peace. It is the common call of
people to discard the old way of thinking and replace it with new concepts and
means to seek and safeguard security. Against this backdrop, the new security
concept featuring dialogue and cooperation has emerged as one of the trends of
the times.”118
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which officially assumed form in 2002,
is hosted in Shanghai, a significant undertaking when one considers that it is the first
multi-lateral organization to be hosted within China’s borders. This alone signifies the
importance Beijing accords to this organization and its future. It also signifies China’s
potential influence within the organization as a host country. As the Chinese government
began considering such an undertaking, several considerations were at play. After the end
of the Cold War, and particularly from the mid-1990s, potentially destabilizing nontraditional security threats began to enter the minds of Chinese policymakers very
seriously, specifically “terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics
and human trafficking, environmental degradation, the spread of infectious diseases, and
118
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natural disasters.”119 As these issues demanded more and more attention from Chinese
policymakers, more time was paid considering potential effects. In the post-Cold War
era, enemies were no longer clear, and with that came the recognition that non-traditional
security challenges must be met with non-traditional solutions. No longer would military
buildup be enough to deter a threat from making an attack.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization arose as a result of these new, nontraditional security challenges, and serves as evidence that China recognizes its national
security issues to be bound up in international security affairs.120 War was to be avoided.
For China to continue development uninterrupted, a deepening of the regional security
blanket was necessary. A shift was taking place, decidedly downgrading North Korea as
a strategic buffer zone121 to a regional risk to be managed, giving the buffer zone role to
the developing Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional organization with the
potential to wield political, economic, and perhaps one day, military power. Backing this
new focus on peaceful development was the power transition in November 2002 from
Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. This is the first time such a leadership change has occurred in
China peacefully, without purges or violence.122 With a new leadership platform, China
decided to pursue its goal of solidifying regional security issues in the form of the
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The creation of a multilateral organization dedicated to resolving current issues
and challenges in a peaceful, more transparent forum, is in direct line with China’s new
direction. In China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the goals for interaction in
the global community are “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual
non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual
benefit; and peaceful coexistence.”123 China’s involvement in the SCO exemplifies this
as all members interact with one another as equals in each forum, respect one another’s
territory through the agreement of non-intrusiveness, and seek to stabilize the region with
economic, social, cultural, and political cooperation.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization afforded China an ideal opportunity to
remedy several issues. In this new neo-realist world, non-traditional threats posed a huge
risk. The attack in New York on September 11th illustrated to every nation just how great
this threat was, and made clear how necessary unorthodox solutions were in this new
century. The cooperation of Russia and China has resolved several issues for both
countries and provided new opportunities. However, both recognized that a deepened
and broader partnership could accomplish the same goals with even greater results.
China recognized that there were certain issues best handled by the cooperation of many,
and not the tremendous effort of one. In the SCO, China seeks to solve several problems
that could one day threaten (or currently threaten) the strength and stability of China
internally, as well as continued successful economic development and involvement
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internationally. This is a fairly well rounded approach, revealing a new outlook for China
of not only pursuit of national interest, but rather enlightened self-interest, where others
benefit alongside a rising China.

Combating Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Separatism
To better deal with issues of terrorism, the SCO Anti-Terrorism Center was
founded in January 2004 and initiated at the following annual SCO meeting the same
year in June. Particularly after the attack in New York on September 11th, China became
very interested in combating potential terrorist attacks and threats multilaterally. Threats
in the post-Cold War era are generally of a nontraditional security form and as such
require different solutions and strategic positioning. The Anti-Terrorism Center within
the SCO is focused upon preventing attacks upon all members in the region, to prevent a
threat from originating in one country, entering another, and destabilizing the entire
region.124 The 2005 Astana summit meeting in part centered upon dealing with the issues
of terrorism. A declaration was issued as a result, stating that the main goals and
purposes of SCO cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts are that the:
“…SCO member states will suppress, within their territories, any attempts to
organize and carry out terrorist attacks, including those aimed against the
interests of other states; they will refuse shelter to persons accused or suspected
in terrorist, separatist, or extremist activities and will extradite such persons
upon appropriate requests on the part of another SCO State in strict compliance
with the existing legislation of the Member-States.”125
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This implies several levels of cooperation, showing the desired depth and reach of the
organization. While the member states are still building confidence between one another,
no doubt working together to resolve issues of terrorism will contribute immensely to that
goal.
A looming concern in China is the control of the internal population, preventing
religious extremism and separatist elements from causing problems. This concern is
legitimate, for “regional rivalry and outright animosity not only persist, but have even
intensified among a populace still significantly fractured according to traditional
geographical, cultural, and linguistic lines.”126 In several border regions there is growing
tension, and concern from Beijing, that these areas may cause continued unrest,
particularly in Xinjiang. Tibet was dealt with brutally after a protest in March of last
year, and still remains a part of China proper. Should Xinjiang decide to agitate
aggressively enough to seek separation from China, members of the SCO would provide
China with verbal and similar non-intrusive support to take care of the problem
internally. One of the main tenants of the SCO is to allow each member country to deal
with such issues internally, without outside assistance or involvement. Keeping outside
influence out has always been one of China’s main concerns – outside interference in
what Beijing considers internal affairs (two main examples are Tibet and Taiwan) and is
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cited as a main security goal for the 21st century.127 No doubt this outlook will continue
for some time to come.
Viewing the ethnic minority issues plaguing the Central Asian states, no doubt
China saw problems in those countries that the Chinese government fears and wishes to
prevent at all costs. Chinese investment in these countries, continued policies of
enlightened self-interest, bettering their stability and independence, both benefit those
countries and China. The goal of involvement is, hopefully, the issues plaguing those
countries will never spread to China or motivate separatist elements within China.128
Particularly of interest to leaders in Beijing was the potential response from China’s
Turkic minorities upon the Central Asian states achieving independence. To mitigate
this threat, “China’s Kazakh and Kyrgyz population were eventually offered limited
opportunities to immigrate to newly independent homelands, which dampened the
potential security threat that they posed.”129 As China has increased involvement in these
countries, the Chinese government wants to maintain friendly relations, meaning
“regimes that are happy to allow an open-door policy regarding Chinese economic
interests and to share Beijing’s definition of which groups constitute security threats.”130
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Essentially, as long as the relationships serve China’s interests, they will continue to
strengthen.
The Chinese government alone cannot successfully deal with China’s internal
issues (particularly when the destabilizing force comes from another country), a
revelatory statement considering China’s prior isolation from the world community. This
new policy also demonstrates the shift in the thinking Beijing leaders’ and its reflection
into policy as China becomes more involved with SCO members, both within and outside
the framework of the organization. Through collaboration with the individual
governments of the Central Asian states, China can help to stabilize their internal issues
and those plaguing China as well; action is mutually beneficial. Beijing strongly
recognizes the current and future potential of increased regional security, which could
lead to China’s enhanced security and progress, socially, economically, and politically.
Not only will these goals be accomplished, but also China’s standing in the international
community and as a regional player will continue to rise. China does not only want
increased political power, however, seeking to partner with member states for increased
economic benefit as well.
China’s Economic Benefits and Challenges in the SCO
In expanding economic cooperation with Central Asian members of the SCO
gives to China expanded access to the energy resources of these countries. In these
smaller countries, China is competing with Russia to tap into energy reserves, but “to
some degree, both recognize that the partial pooling of efforts to be to their individual
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advantage.”131 Although China collaborates with Russia within the SCO, Beijing is in the
end out to service itself with involvement in Central Asia.
Trade and investment with the Central Asian states is increasing from China as
well. In one particular project, China and Khazakhstan are working together to build an
oil pipeline, to bring oil from the country into China. As China develops, it is vitally
important that progress is not inhibited by an inability to obtain energy resources. The
Central Asian countries help the Chinese government allay their fears of this possibility.
Zhang Deguang, SCO Secretary General, at a June 6th press conference in Beijing, spoke
of the “great importance” of security cooperation for China within the SCO, detailing the
establishment of a group “to study cooperation projects, cooperation orientation and the
implementation of cooperation projects in this sector.”132 Thus far the greatest success for
China has been through bilateral energy agreements with Central Asian states, however
studies are being conducted and joint projects are up for consideration which will allow
member states to cooperate together. The energy cooperative framework of the SCO is
still under development, currently working to China’s advantage as members work
together to increase the vitality of future efforts. Leaders in Beijing can call upon the
responsibility of Central Asian states to act in the interest of the SCO and the region in
partnering with China on energy projects.
The wealth of Russia and China allows Central Asian states to benefit the smaller,
131

Ibid.

132

Interview with SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang, “Image Improvement,”
Beijing Review, June 6, 2006, http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/06-24-e/w-3.htm (accessed
September 3, 2008).

59

less wealthy and successful states to rebuild infrastructure and for other development
projects, offering credit and financing opportunities.133 In 2003 SCO members signed an
agreement to work toward an eventual free trade area for SCO members.134 A year later,
plans were solidified into a directive detailing 100+ specific actions to be taken to ease
and increase trade between member states. At a September meeting, Wen Jiabao, Chinese
Premier, described his desires for SCO members. Premier Wen,
“wanted members to set as a long-term objective the establishment of a free
trade area within the SCO; elaborate a series of more immediate measures such
as improving the flow of goods across the member-states and reducing nontariff barriers such as customs, quarantine, standards and transport services; and
create large projects on economic and technological cooperation, giving priority
to those in transportation, energy, telecommunication, agriculture, home
appliances, light industry and textiles.”135
Premier Wen highlighted several markets where he hopes SCO membership will
advance, helping both the organization as a whole and, naturally, China in particular.
Each of those industries is important in China and cooperation will ensure access to good
and services China needs to continue its rise. China’s participation in the SCO reveals
the foresight of the Chinese government, and the continued importance of economic
growth in the strategic goals of Chinese policy. Ensuring economic growth is not limited
to discovering new trade partners and opportunities, but also ensuring the stability of
133
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border areas and the region as a whole. Economic growth does not depend upon the
internal stability of China alone, but also the external stability of border areas and
countries in the Asian region.

Border Disputes: A Thing of the Past?
One of the main goals in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is utilizing
partnerships to stabilize and prevent future border disputes. China and Russia have
experienced the benefits, through agreements they have ensured that their 2,600-mile
border is no longer an area of conflict, as it was intensely “from the 1960s to the late
1980s. After squandering scarce funds on border defense and stunting the economic
growth of their border regions, the two neighbors now are working to settle any
outstanding issues [and] to deepen confidence-building measures.”136 There is reason to
be concerned about remedying these expenses to bring Chinese military expenditures
down for issues able to be fixed with peaceful means. China has been involved in many
disputes located in border areas that were dealt with through the use of force or all out
war:
“According to the data set on foreign policy crises generated by Jonathan
Brecher, Michael Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Rosen, [China] has been involved in
eleven foreign policy crises through 1985 and has resorted to violence in eight
(72 percent), proportionally more than the other major powers in the twentieth
century. Comparable figures for the U.S., the USSR, and the UK from 1927 to
1985 are 18 percent, 27 percent, and 12 percent, respectively. And according to
the researchers, the Chinese use of violence has been what they label “high
intensity,” involving “serious clashes” or “full-scale war.” Second, these crises
were all located along China’s borders. Territorial disputes were thus crucial
136
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drivers in most of these crises.”137
One goal of an organization like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is to make fullout war over border disputes a thing of the past, ideally. Thus far this has proven to be
true. China has resolved all of its border disputes with neighbors, not wishing to drain
resources by becoming involved in an unnecessary conflict. China’s rising star must
continue to rise with uninhibited and uninterrupted development and innovation. China
accords the SCO with much responsibility and has invested greatly to ensure that China’s
borders remain stable. With North Korea threatening to destabilize the region, a
progression described in Chapter One and Chapter Two of this paper, securing all other
borders and being prepared for whatever Pyongyang may do becomes of heightened
importance.138
Although Russia and China have resolved a majority of border disputes, two
islands remain under debate, revealing underlying suspicions and tension despite the best
efforts of China and Russia. Tarabarov/Yinlong and Bolshoy Ussuriiskiy/Heixiazi are
both sought by China and Russia, Russia fearing that the city of Khabarovsk Krai would
be under strategic threat if the buffer space were lost and China wanted to extend its
territory.139 Although it is possible that this conflict could be shuffled down the list of
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priorities as Russia and China continue to work together, no doubt some degree of
tension will continue to plague the relationship. The suspicion on both sides also
suggests that despite the best of alliances, it just might not be good enough to prevent real
conflict.

Military Cooperation: Joint Military Exercises and Arms Sales
When the SCO members began to work together on security issues, it was only
natural that member states would begin collaborating on the level of military events.
This is not to say that members have jumped in feet first and combined forces, but
symbolic and real joint measures have been taken since the organization began forming
in the mid-1990s. Cooperation in the SCO builds upon initial agreements in the 1990s
and early 2000s, detailed in the prior analysis of rising Russo-Chinese relations in a
regional and bi-lateral manner. Current arrangements deepen military cooperation
through joint exercises, building confidence and partnership between members.
Despite this successful cooperation, it remains to be seen if the other member
states of the SCO would rise to its defense in a NATO-like manner were a member state
challenged militarily by another nation. At this point in time the alliance is nowhere near
the level of cooperation and integration, particularly for Russia and China. Although
they may host military joint exercises, both countries still act in their national interest and
not the national interest of the organization as a whole when it comes to armed conflict.
The SCO is a long way from acting cohesively as a military unit, despite political and
economic cooperation and progress.
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For China, a desire to participate in confidence building military exercises with
others is balanced with traditional Chinese thought regarding China’s national interest.
President Hu Jintao stated that:
“We must always follow the guidance of Mao Zedong's military thinking, Deng
Xiaoping's thinking on building the armed forces in the new period and Jiang
Zemin's thinking on building national defense and the armed forces, and take
the Scientific Outlook on Development as an important guiding principle for
strengthening national defense and the armed forces. We must implement the
military strategy for the new period, [and] accelerate the revolution in military
affairs with Chinese characteristics.”140
The key statement here is the call to prior Chinese strategy and military thought, which
pulled China slowly away from North Korea and may pull it away, eventually, from
Russia. The Chinese characteristic of military development may eventually conflict with
the Russian characteristics and desires when implementing into policy. This military
cooperation has raised eyebrows all over the world as countries debate the intentions and
purpose of a military component of the SCO. Donald Rumsfeld, in response to the
SCO’s 2005 military exercises that there is no reason to panic: “I mean, countries do
that… We are obviously observing what takes place, but I didn’t see anything in it that
was threatening…”141 Is this viewpoint correct or is the SCO, and China as a main
country driving SCO policy, shaping itself as an anti-U.S. force in the region? What is
140
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the purpose of the SCO in Asia for China? How does the SCO serve China’s interests?
The exact purpose of the SCO is up for debate; one element heavily debated is whether
the SCO serves to counter U.S. influence in the region.

A 21st Century Anti-U.S. Buffer Zone?
The SCO has repeatedly stated that it is not directed against any country: “the
SCO is neither a bloc nor a closed alliance, is not directed against any individual
countries or groups of states and is open for broad cooperation with other states.”142 It is
often said that the SCO military cooperation could be leading toward the eventual goal of
providing a balance to the influence of NATO in the region. This, however, is
contradicted by the fact that NATO’s Partnership for Peace counts among its members all
five Central Asian states.143 Member states also repeatedly enforce the idea that the SCO
is not meant to be a military bloc. The United States has also played a key role in Central
Asia. In Tajikistan, for example, the United States contributed over $40 million dollars
toward securing the borders once the country regained border security responsibility from
Russia.
The SCO is credited with maintaining that the bases established by the US in the
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region are temporary.144 After the U.S. began the war with Afghanistan, these bases
should be slowly dismantled and removed. Both Russia and China view the bases as the
U.S. enforcing its presence in the region, a region where both countries would like to
exert their influence to tap into vital energy resources. In Uzbekistan, SCO members,
particularly Russia and China, are credited with pressuring the government to force the
U.S. to withdraw troops from the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base.145 The SCO in July 2005
issued an official declaration calling for the removal of U.S. troops from bases in
Uzbekistan. By the end of 2005 U.S. forces were completely withdrawn from
Uzbekistan. Although the SCO’s influence can be debated (some say the SCO
declaration only hastened an already made plan for U.S. removal146), the SCO did have
some influence. Increasingly the SCO has been putting influence upon its membership to
act to benefit the SCO as a whole, lending credence to the potential future (more
powerful) presence of the organization in the region. These actions are only in the
beginning stages, however, as American influence is still present in the region and the
power of the SCO as a whole is still being established.
The removal of U.S. troops from Uzbekistan is the beginning of a hoped rollback
of American influence from the region, allowing China and Russia (both bi-laterally and
144
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multilaterally within the SCO) to fill the void. Russia is said to be “[operating] [u]nder
the working title "Creeping Expansion Of Mysterious And Unpredictable China" on one
side, and "Concerns About the Aggressive Policies of the United States in the Region" on
the other, [and] is strengthening its cooperation in the military-political and militarytechnical spheres in the framework of such alliances as the CIS and CSTO, especially
with the countries of Central Asia.”147 Increased influence from Russia and China in the
region will help Uzbekistan (money can be extended from the SCO for regional
development projects) as well as giving Russia and China access to Central Asian energy
resources. Finally, the Central Asian states can provide a strategic buffer zone for China
as American influence declines. The Asian Times quoted David Wall from the
Washington Times, as saying that "an expanded SCO would control a large part of the
world's oil and gas reserves and [a] nuclear arsenal. It would essentially be an OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] with bombs."148 While this perspective
may be alarmist, it may also be accurate in its forecasting of the future of the SCO.
Unfortunately, a clear answer will have to wait until the organization develops further.
Uzbekistan appears to be, for the SCO, the “steering country,” allowing the SCO to
demonstrate its will through Uzbek action.149 So, perhaps the SCO in this case is
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providing China and Russia the necessary camouflage needed to accomplish their
national goals in the name of regional security and the SCO.
Also lending credit to the anti-U.S. influence in Asia line of thought, is the
presence of Iran at meetings as an observer nation. Both China and Russia have had
long-term relationships with Iran on a bilateral level, dealing both economically and
militarily. These relationships have come under fire recently due to Iran’s nuclear
ambitions. It is worth noting here that both Russia and China have been hesitant to
embrace Iran fully at the meetings and are even more hesitant to consider the country for
permanent membership in the SCO, thus mitigating the anti-U.S. nature of Iran’s
involvement. China in particular is of concern because allowing Iran to join could cause
“China’s original interest [in the SCO] – to neutralize its western neighbors – will not
have been lost but submerged amid other issues.”150 This is of particular concern with
SCO expansion for China – that the Chinese not lose their influence over the direction
and future of the organization. Allowing Iran entry could have that cost with unequal
benefit. Finally, “China and Russia are wary of making Iran a full member on the
grounds that Iranian membership could give the SCO more of an anti-American tone.”151
It is worth adding here that it would give the SCO an overt anti-American tone, for Iran is
not shy about speaking negatively about American presence and influence in the region.
Together to Reshape the Eurasian Community,” Brookings Institute, January 28, 2008: 2,
www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/0128_asia_iwashita.aspx (accessed November 1,
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Russia and China in the SCO have been far more hesitant to target the U.S. directly in
communiqués, instead characterizing their regional organization as directed against no
one state.
The 2005 declarations for U.S. troop removal in Central Asia are as pointed as the
SCO gets when it comes to anti-American rhetoric. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
consider the exact wording of the 2005 Astana Declaration:
“We support and will continue to provide our support to the efforts of the
international coalition that carries out the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan.
Today we note the positive dynamics in the stabilization of the internal political
situation in Afghanistan. Some SCO member-states have provided their onground infrastructure for the temporary deployment of the coalition troops, as
well as their territory and air-space for the purposes of military transit in the
interest of the antiterrorist operation. Taking into account the completion of the
active combat phase of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the SCO
member-states consider it necessary that the relevant members of the
antiterrorist coalition take a decision on the deadlines for the temporary use of
the abovementioned infrastructure facilities and military presence on the
territory of the SCO member-states.”152
Some perspectives support that the SCO does not pose any threat to the U.S.
According to Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, stated that, “Today, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization does not
pose any direct threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia or in the region more generally,
although its annual meetings have, most particularly in 2005, become an opportunity for
member states of that organization to vent their frustration with the U.S. in general and
U.S. critiques of their non-democratic political systems in particular.”153
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Is the SCO directed against the U.S. because of these actions or could there be
another reason for U.S. suspicion? The United States often laments the lack of
transparency from China (and the SCO) as one reason for concern about the
organization’s potential anti-U.S. intentions. However, one familiar with Chinese
philosophy will know that “virtually all military writers from Sunzi [sic] (Sun-tzu [sic])
onward stressed the need for secrecy, pondered its nature, and articulated highly
sophisticated measures for its preservation.”154 Although referring here to specifically
military planning, this theory has embedded itself into Chinese government and public
life as well.155 There is some concern from the United States that China’s military
buildup, and the joint military exercises of SCO members, may be an element of an antiU.S. strategy.156 In this statement lies the possibility that Russia and China created the
SCO to have a viable and valid platform for voicing their concerns about U.S. uses (or
abuses) of power, essentially a legitimate forum for discussion; one the U.S. would have
to pay attention to and which has legitimacy in the international arena. The actual antiU.S. intentions of the SCO are as vague as its mission and intentions, but it does allow
China the opportunity to meet with like minds and discuss ways to develop their power at
the expense of the U.S., both in the Central Asian region and potentially globally.
Organization Changing the “Playing Field” in Central Asia, September 26, 2006,
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It is key to note that in all Chinese philosophy concerning international relations,
emphasis is placed upon thinking and planning long term; compare that drawn out
strategy with the more western short-term planning style, at times only weeks ahead.157
As a result, this could be a factor complicating U.S. perception of Chinese strategy and
action post-Cold War.158 China brings this strategy to the SCO as well, focusing upon
slowly and carefully managing the buildup and growth of the organization. With this
focus, Beijing can maximize individual benefits as well as broader organizational
benefits. The SCO itself has continued to affirm its planning is peaceful and not pointed
against any specific entity, successfully maintaining vague policy goals and upholding
the Chinese virtue of secrecy.

Conclusion
While the methods of achieving Chinese strategic goals may have changed, at the
heart of all the changes lies an interest on the part of China to hedge U.S. influence in the
region (and global community), solidify economic growth, continue to seek a strong
China and a multi-polar world, and in all cases, act in the national interest of the Chinese
state. The priorities of the Chinese government have shifted over time, from uniting in
the defense of North Korea and the Communist movement to presently developing a
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multilateral organization with much potential to wield power in several different parts of
Asia. Chinese relations with North Korea are currently strained and full of tension
regarding several topics, but are absolutely necessary to maintain for the strength and
stability of the region. Paying this price to maintain Chinese growth outweighs the risk
posed by a North Korean collapse. As China’s priorities changed and the relationship
became more of a liability, China found a new mutually beneficial relationship with its
neighbor in the north, Russia, to pursue a capitalist revolution at the expense of the old
Communist ideology. This relationship deepened and expanded into the SCO.
The Russia-Chinese partnership has a foundation, which, thus far, has carried the
relationship fairly well through the challenges in the 21st century. Chinese strategic
priorities of border security, maintained economic growth, pursuing targeted military
development, and energy security, to name a few, are well served through cooperation
with the Russian government since the end of the Cold War. Where the relationship is
weaker, however, lies in the underlying tensions in the relationship, particularly mutual
suspicion on the part of both the Russian and Chinese governments, each wondering what
the other would do as a strong power in a world without U.S. hegemony.
Despite these suspicions, their partnership continues due to the high mutual
benefit. Although “China and Russia aren't perfect strategic partners…their concerns
about American global power, EU/NATO expansion, more Orange/Rose/Tulip
revolutions and Japan's higher international profile, are encouraging the long-time rivals
to give each other a second look.”159 It is this underlying mistrust in particular that will
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inhibit complete cooperation between the governments, in particular intelligence sharing
and military cooperation. However, the relationship is currently beneficial for both and
will continue strongly in part due to the countries joint founding of and involvement
within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This organization makes it all the more
important for Russia and China to maintain healthy relations.
As China deepens its relationships with member states in the SCO, and ponders
partnership with other regional states, at the core of strategic considerations is China’s
national interest. For China, the SCO is a growing buffer zone in Asia against
international interference in the region and internally, a forum where concerns can be
voiced and policies enacted that are not exactly in line with the current norms of the
international system. Is China creating for itself an organization with the potential to
wield power in the region or on a global scale? Or is the SCO developing so strongly due
to the fact that it offers so many opportunities to satisfy Chinese strategic goals in the 21st
century? Unfortunately, a clear answer to these questions still cannot be accessed. The
SCO must be watched closely as it develops, particularly Chinese involvement, to
ascertain a clear idea of China’s future goals in the SCO.
The SCO is still taking shape, so the answers to these questions are as uncertain as
China’s future positioning in the international arena. The future of the Russo-Chinese
relationship is also uncertain. Could relations eventually become as strained as ChineseNorth Korean Relations? Absolutely, it could happen; but with foundations stronger than
that of the Chinese-North Korean relationship, the future looks much brighter. The future
should be brighter as long as Russia continues to satisfy the concern at the heart of
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China’s strategy – the continued strength and growth of the Chinese nation, satisfying
new challenges and priorities with ancient strategic foundations and economic growth.
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